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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
PAUL SUGAR and HARRY ULMER,
doing business a.s SUGAR & ULMER,
a co-partnership,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case No. 8639
vs.
HARRY B. MILLER,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action brought by the plaintiffs against
the defendant seeking payment on a Promissory Note
in the a1nount of $2,000.00 plus interest that the plaintiffs
signed as guarantors .and that the defendant signed as
primary obligor. The defendant counter-claimed, seeking
an offset upon an alleged amount o'ving for the publication by the defendant of the Prospectus of Deseret
Uranium Corporation.
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By stipulation at the trial, the defendant confessed
judgment .as prayed in the Complaint (R. 9). This left
as the only issue the propriety and the amount of the
offset. The plaintiffs as agent for Deseret Uranium
Corporation (R. 42, 43), contacted the defendant Harry
B. Miller, doing business as Lorraine Press, concerning
the printing of the Prospectus of Deseret Uranium
Corporation (R. 10 and 12). During this first negotiation, the defendant wa.s informed that he was to be paid
out of the underwriting proceeds received by Deseret
Uranium Corporation (R. 16, 47) and the defendant
indicated that he understood that the money was to come
from the underwriting (R. 42).
The defendant printed the Offering Circular and
thereafter billed Deseret lTranium Corporation for these
printing serviees (R. 21, 25, 27, 51), (Exs. 2, 3). The
defendant carried this account on its books in the name
of Deseret Uranium Corporation \vithout an~ offset
shown \vhatsoever right up to the tune of trial (R. 27).
The defendant also looked to the corporation for payntent during the same period (R. 28).
During the p·eriod fro1n the first negotiation up to
the tilne of trial, the defendant, !{r. :Jiiller, had never
requested the plaintiffs to personally pay the bill (R.
2-t-, 51), and there is nothing in \Yriting indicating the
pronli:4e of the plaintiffs to pay the bill or indicating an
assnn1ption of the responsibility for said payn1ent

(R. 27).
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3
The underwriting by Deseret Uranium Corporation
"\Vas never completed and no money was received by reason thereof (R. 44 and 50). The plaintiffs received
nothing by way of consideration either from the corporation or from the defendant.
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I.
THAT THE STIPULATION OF TI-IE DEFENDANT PRECLUDES THE COURT FROM MAKING A FINDING ON THE
COMPLAINT OF NO· CAUSE O·F ACTION.
POINT II.
THAT THE COURT'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFFS
AGREED TO· PAY THE DEFENDANT IS A .CONCLUSION
OF LAW NO·T SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT.
POINT III.
THAT THE COURT'S FINDING OF FACT THAT THE
PLAINTIFFS AGREED TO PAY THE DEFENDANT IS
BARRED BY THE STA·TUTE OF FRAUDS.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THAT THE STIPULATION OF THE DEFENDANT PR.ECLUDES THE COURT FROM MAKING A FINDING ON THE
COMPLAINT OF NO· CAUSE OF ACTION.

The Complaint (R. 1) sets forth the primary obligation of the defendant .and the secondary obligation of
the plaintiffs on a certain Promissory Note payable to
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Continental Bank & Trust Company. The allegations
of this Complaint were agreed to by stipulation (R. 9).
Judgment for $2,000.00 plus interest at 6%, totalling
$2,150.00 plus attorney's fees in the amount of $500.00
should have been given to the plaintiffs.
Thereafter to the extent that defendant proved his
entitlement to a judgment in excess of the judgment
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, he would be entitled
to judgment and an offset against the plaintiffs'
judgment.
Here the Court in giving judgment to the defendant,
disregarded the interest and the attorney's fees stipulated
to by the defendant and to 'vhich the plaintiffs were
entitled.
Plaintiffs' contention on this point is necessarily
applicable only in the event that plaintiffs' contention
on Point II and III do not prevail.
POINT II.
THAT THE COURT'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFFS
AGREED TO· PAY THE DEFENDANT IS A CONCLUSION
OF LA\V NOT SUPPO·RTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT.

The ·Court in it's Findings of Fact X o. 3, erroneou.sly
eon eludes that the plaintiffs agreed (italirs added)~
to pay the defendant for the printing. This agreen1ent
is a eonelusion of la\v \Yhich is not substantiated by any
Finding of Fact n1ade hy the Court. ''Thether or not
there \vas nn agreen1ent "Tas one of the prin1ary issues in
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the law suit, and whether or not the evidence in the
record established an agree·ment is a Conclusion of Law.
Therefore, neither the conclusion as to the agreement
nor the Conclusions of L.aw designated as such are
substantiated by any Findings of Fact by the Court.
There just i.s no appropriate finding to support these
conclusions.
POIN'T III.
THAT THE COURT'S FINDING OF FACT THAT THE
PLAINTIFFS AGREED TO PAY T'HE DEFENDANT IS
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

At the conclusion of defendant's case, plaintiffs
moved to dismiss urging the Statute of F:rauds as a
basis therefor. Said n1otion was denied and the Court
thereafter made it.s finding that the plaintiff agreed to
pay the defendant for the•printing. This finding and the
Rubsequenrt conclusion that the defendant is entitled to
judgment are both barred by the Statute of Frauds.
Plaintiffs maintain that recovery based upon any
statements m.ade by the plaintiffs constituting an agreement to pay the defendant is barred by the following
Section of the Statute of Frauds, Title 25-5-4, Utah Code.
Annotated, 1953, as amended.
"In the following cases every agreement sh.all
be void unless such agreement or some note or
memorandum thereof is in writing subscribed by
the party to be charged therewith:
" ( 2) Every promise to answer for the debt,
default or miscarriage of another."
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Those factor.s to be considered in determining
whether or not a promise comes under the aforesaid
Statute are as follows:

Credit Relied Upon. If defendant, 2,1iller, relied solely upon the credit of the plaintiffs, and the other
following elements are favorable, then the promise of
the plaintiffs is an original promise not within the Statute of Frauds. Ho\vever, if any reliance i.s placed upon
the credit of Deseret Uranium Corporation, then the
plaintiffs' promise is collateral and is within the Statute
of Frauds. The general rule is stated in 49 A1n. Jur. 61
at p. 418:
(a)

·~rt

1nay be asserted generally that an undertaking ,,~hich renders the promissor a guarantor
or surety upon a debt owing by a third person who
is pri1narily liable is "\Yithin the Statute of Frauds
"\rhether n1ade before, after or contemporaneously
"\Yi th the inception of the third persons liability
provided the pro1uisee knows or has reason to
kno\\~ of the guarantee or suretyship relation.
The Statute is applicable "~here credit is extended
priinariJ~~ to the old debtor or ".,.here the tenor of
the entire transaction is that the promissor purposed to help out the old debtor and verbally
pro1nised to p.ay his debt.'~

In the ca ~{' of }J_, i! erlsc 11 YS. TfTeber) :255 Pac. :?nd 130
( 0 l'<'g'Oll) the (~ourt st.n ted:
.. "\.V]lether a pron1ise is original or collateral
hPfore there is any- delivery of n1aterials or serYieP~ hy- a ereditor n1ay- ordinarily be deternrined
hy this test: .Did the parties understand that the
~Pllt'r \Y:ls extt'nding credit for the Inaterials or
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labor on the credit of the party sought to be
charged or to him only as a guarantor of payment
.should another fail to pay."
In the case of G~tto~uslcy vs. 11alliburton Oil Well
CenLenting Co:npany, 287 Pac. 2nd 204 (Okla.), the Court
held:
"If credit is given solely to the promissor, it
is an original promise and not within the Statute
of Frauds, but if any credit be given to the third
party, the defendants' promise is collateral and
must be in writing. Nor does it matter upon which
of the two parties the plaintiff principally depends
for p.ayment so long as the third party is at all
liable to him to do the same thing which the defendant has engaged to do."
Under these cases and particularly the Gutowsky
ca.se, it is apparent that the promisee, l\Iiller, must have
looked solely to the plaintiffs for payment in this matter.
The evidence does not sustain such a position by the
defendant. The fact that defendant, l\1iller, looked to
the corporation rather than to the plaintiff is evidenced
in many ways. !-Ie was told at the very outset that the
money was to come from the underwriting of the company (R. 16, 47); he, himself, admitted that he was looking to the corporation for payment nearly up to the time
that the law suit wa.s filed ( R. 28) ; his billings were all
made to the corporation and not to the plaintiffs (R.
21, 25, 27, 51); no demand in writing or otherwise was
made to the plaintiffs for the payment of this amount
(R. 24) ; and finally, the defendant carried the account
on its books in the narne of Deseret Uranium Corporation
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never showing an alleged offset for payment of the $2,000.00 (R. 27, 28).
The last fact involving the record of the account
is vitally important in the determination of the reliance
by the promisee upon the credit of the promi.ssor. The
rule is set forth in 49 Am. Jur. 94 as follows:
"The fact that goods are charged on the books
of a merchant to the person for whose use they
were furnished i.s prima facie evidence, at least
that they were sold on his credit, and not exclusively on the credit of the person orally promising
to be responsible for the price; and the fact that
at the time the goods are delivered to the third
person they are charged to both the promissor and
such third person ha.s been held not to be sufficient
to render an original undertaking."
In the rase of lVood vs. Dodge, 120 X.\\T. 77± (S.D.),
the Court said :
"In determining to 'vhom, as between the
promissor. and the person for "~hose benefit the
promise is 1nade, the credit "~as actually given,
an important consideration is the manner in which
the creditor entered the transaction in his books.
Evidence that the goods sold \vere charged to the
person to "~hon1 they "~ere delivered strongly
tends to sho". that the Yendor gave credit to hun
and relied upon hilu for pay1nent~ and therefore,
that the pro1nise of another to be ans,Yer.able for
the d<-•ht \Yas, at n1ost, a collateral undertaking."
In this eonneetion~ 8t't' al8o Jl cJI ill au vs. D·ickover,
r~ae. ln-± (Or<>.)~ 59 .A... L.R. 181.
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In v1ew of the foregoing facts, it is impossible to
find that the defendant relied entirely upon the credit
of the plaintiffs in the furnishing of the printing of the
Prospectus. Defendant's own witness rebuts this po.sition
in indicating that defendant was told at the outset that
the n1oney "\Vas to come from the underwriting. Furthermore, the Prospectus, at Page 7, indic.ates the obligation
of the cornpany to pay for the printing services out of
the undervvriting proceeds. The defendant in printing
the Prospectus \\-rould certainly be aware of such a
prOVISIOn.
(b) Consideration to Promissor. In order that the
promise to pay can be considered as an original promise,
there must be an independent conside1~ation benefiting the
promissor. Hovv-ever, as stated in 49 Atn. Jur. 73, p. 425;
the mere exj stance of consideration doe.s not make the
promise an original one:
"The provision that a man should not be held
in his promise to pay the debt of another unless
the agreement is in writing does not render unnecessary a con.sideration for such promise when
written. As has been well said, if the circumst.anees
of the promise having been founded on a consideration is sufficient to take it out of the statute,
the law is precisely the same now as it was before
the statute was passed, and one of the most important statutes, has by construction become a dead
letter."
In the case at bar, no consideration was to pass to
the plaintiffs, other than th.at to which they were already
entitled for the acquisition of properties and for the
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rendering of services for the corporation (R. 10, 11 and
12). There is no evidence of any independent consideration or benefit pas.sing to the plaintiffs by reason of the
printing of the Prospectus. The plaintiffs benefited only
indirectly from the printing of the Prospectu_s and any
benefit accruing to the plaintiffs was no more and no
different than that accruing to the corporation.
The case of J annsen vs. Curtis et al, 47 Pac. 2nd 662
(Wash.), involved the case of a principal stockholc:er who
controlled the corporation and ".,.ho or.all;; promised to
pay the corporation's obligation. The Court in holding
that the promise was within the Statute of Frauds stated:
"The promise was to answer for the debt of
the corporation. Not being in writing, it will not
support an action unless there "~as some benefit
or consideration different from that accruing to
the corporation itself."
This line of cases is discussed in S A.L.R. 1193~ 35
A.L.R. 2nd 906. Again in the case of K-i.ng \S. Schnall. 57
N.\\T. 2nd 287 (Neb.), the Court held that:

"A consideration to support a pron1ise not in
"'riting to pay the debt of another Inust operate
to the advantage of the pron1issor, and place hiln
under a pecuniary obligation to the pro1nissee
independent of the original debt, "~hich obligation
is to be diseharged by the pay1nent of that debt."
(~ertainl)·

under the nboYe principals, it cannot be
said that tlH•rp "·.as nny consideration pa.ssing to the
pro111is~or~ thP plain tiff~~, sufficient to support an original
pron1 i ~~t' to pay· the printing bill.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

Pr·imary Obligation Nat Extinguished. The.
third factor to consider in determining whether or not
the alleged promise to pay is an original or collateral
obligation is the statu.s of the corporation's obligation.
If the obligation continues after the promise is made, the
promise is collateral.
(c)

In the case of Richardson Press vs. Albright, 224
N.Y. 497, an officer of the company promised to see that
the printing debt of the company was paid. The promis.sor had a controlling interest in the comp~any. The
account was carried by the printer under the co1npany
name. Judge Pound in giving the decision of the Court,
held that even though there might be a new consideration to the defendant (the promissor) and even though
he might have a beneficial interest in the accomplishment
of the printing, the primary debt of the corporation
remained. He stated:
"The tenor of the entire transaction was that
defendant purposed to help out the Oceanic Company and verbally promised to pay its debts ....
the ancient purpose of the Statute of Fraud.s w.as
to require satisfactory evidence of the promise
to answer for the debt of another p·erson, and its
efficacy should not be wasted by unsubstantial
verbal distinctions."
In the case of Mid-Atlantic Appliances, Inc. v. Morgan, 73 S.E. 2nd 385 (Virginia), 35 A.L.R. 2nd 899, the
Court held that notwithstanding the promise of the corporation officer to pay the debt of the corporation, the
corporation's debt still remained unextinguished and th.at,
therefore, the officer's pro1nise wa.s a collateral promise
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within the application of the Statute of Fr.auds. This
principal is well annotated in 35 A.I.J.R. 2nd 906.
Certainly in the case at bar, the obligation of Deseret
Uranium Corporation remained in existence notwithstanding the alleged promise by the pl.aintiffs to pay the
debt. This is evidenced by the fact that as we have indicated above, the defendant, Miller, himself indicated in
answer to the question : "You were still expecting the
corporation to pay the full amount of the bill?", he
answered, "Oh, definitely, because l\1:r. Uln1er called
me about it and asked me that question. ..._ud so did Paul
Sugar. They both called me.'' This is further evidenced
by the fact that the corporation was continually billed
for the services, the records of the defendant sho\Yed the
account in the name of the corporation \Yithout any off.set
of the alleged personal payment of $2,000.00, and by the
fact that the Prospectus represented that certain monies
fro1n the proceeds of the under\Yriting were to be used
for the printing expenses.
S1~~I~IA.RY

The farts involved in the subject case and the contention of the defendant 'Yith respect thereto nfford us
nn Pxcellent exau1ple of the neressity of the .application
of this section of the Statute of Frauds. lTpon the bare
verbal clain1 of the defendant, the plaintiffs here have
had plaeed upon the1n a liability of $2,468.00. This, notwithstanding the fact that no definite terrns as to the
tinH~ or as to the tern1s of payn1ent have been show11
by thP dc\fendant. Such uneertainty aceo1upanying such
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a liability should not be resolved in favor of the defendant n1erely upon his lone understanding of the facts.
To shift to the plaintiffs an obligation clearly that
of Deseret U rani urn Corp·oration should require not
merely an uncertain verbal statement, but rather a written instrument clearly defining the terms of the transaction. I-Iere the plaintiffs relied upon the defendant
being paid from the underwriting proceeds. The defendant, however, did not rely entirely upon the plaintiffs.
He was clearly told, a.s is indicated by defendant's witness, that the p·ayment would be out of the underwriting
proceeds. To submit the plaintiffs to the po_ssibility
of such uncertainty and such liability as is here attempted
IS one very good reason for adhering to the concepts
of the Statute of ],rauds.
In view of the foregoing authorities and of the application of the facts of the case at bar to the legal principles
established by said .authorities, Appellants respectfully
maintain that the judgment of the lower Court be reversed, that the defendant take nothing by his CounterClaim and that plaintiffs have judgment in accordance
with the Complaint and Stipulation p-ertaining thereto.
CLYDE & MECHAM

By -----------------------------------------------------Elliott Lee Pratt
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Appellants
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
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